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Reviewed by Charles M. Grayt
The most general of this book's many distinctions is that it places
an important chapter of the technical legal history of the last three
centuries in a rich setting of intellectual, economic, and political his-
tory. If the strict legal history were much reduced, the book would
remain outstanding both as a synthesis of specialized work by histo-
rians and as a commentary on English institutional history and its
intellectual counterpoint from the eighteenth century to the present.'
By combining that larger picture with private law, Professor Atiyah
has achieved much more. Lawyer's law is not deprived of its autonomy,
but neither is it separated from the forces that have impinged on it
during this period of incomparable change. In an account characterized
by complexity and sensitivity to cross-currents, the book shuns a pat
theory of the relationship between law and general history. Rather,
it shows both consonances and dissonances between legal history and
wider movements in thought and material life. Indeed, one of the
book's important substantive arguments is that the law of contracts
in the nineteenth century was in fundamental harmony with prevail-
ing ideology and social needs; by contrast, in the altered moral and
institutional environment of England since 1870, contract law has
lacked a policy drawn from outside itself and has only edged toward
conformity with new values.
t Professor of History, University of Chicago.
1. Although Professor Atiyah acknowledges that much of his account is relevant to
concurrent developments in both the United States and Scotland, the book is largely
confined to the English experience. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT Viii (1979) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. Nonetheless, the book
occasionally brings in American law and makes use of the more developed American
historical scholarship, such as Professor Grant Gilmore's THE DFATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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Professor Atiyah divides his book into three sections with parallel
structures. In each, the intellectual, economic, and political-institu-
tional background to legal history is discussed, and then the legal his-
tory itself. The first section is mostly about the eighteenth century,
but it subsumes, as terminus a quo, the earlier history of contracts
and of England, from which the eighteenth century broke cleanly
away only in its final decades. The second section covers the heyday
of freedom of contract and classical doctrine, 1770 to 1870-a time of
unexampled economic development and social dislocation under a
competitive regime of numerous small businesses. Political economy
and utilitarianism provided for this era-in a way no other ideology
in history has quite matched-both a consciousness of what was hap-
pening and a set of prescriptions for what ought to happen. Ironically,
the market in this period, which often worked as it was supposed to,
was given its head partly by default, while an earnest society struggled
to gain the science and the administrative organization to confront
its problems by deliberate collective action. The book's final section
deals with the decline of freedom of contract in the fractionated en-
vironment of 1870 to the present. In these times, the law has been
neither disengaged from its nineteenth-century past nor unswayed by
the changed values, the collectivistic legislation, and the reorganiza-
tion of the private sector that have rendered that past unreal. Intel-
lectuals have not shared a vision of the "is" in hopeful conjunction
with the "ought," and the law has scarcely listened to their diverse
voices.
Freedom of contract suggests primarily the rights to make almost
any contract, to depend on its enforcement in some sense, and not
to have the plain terms of the contract scrutinized for fairness. Di-
rectly antithetical to this freedom are the notion of a just price and
a panoply of legal limitations on what one can effectively contract to
do. Although one of the book's central themes is the rise and fall of
freedom in this sense, it is also about the life and moribundity of
classical contract law as that is understood by the modem lawyer-
the law that was systematized, in its years of diminished vigor, by
such treatise writers as Sir William Anson 2 and Sir Frederick Pollock.3
The classical law has several familiar principal features. Its moral
2. W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAw OF CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS
RELATION TO CONTRACT (1879).
3. F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CoNRACT (1875).
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root is the proposition that promises ought to be kept, almost no
matter what-a proposition that is encumbered with problems of
meaning, and neither as obvious in ethics as it is sometimes assumed
to be, nor supportable by a single set of reasons common to all mor-
alists.4 Although the proposition can hardly be denied some sort of
axiomatic status in most ages and value systems, it can be taken more
or less seriously in competition with other values and can be accom-
modated by the law in various ways. To the essentialistic question
"what is a contract?", the classical law replies that a bilateral contract,
to adhere to the paradigm case, exists when the wills or intentions of
the parties are in accord. The end of contract law is to see that states
of affairs to which people looking into the future have committed
their wills come about in reality-or rather, that a party worse off
for their failure to come about is put in the monetary position he
would occupy if the project had succeeded. This contrasts with saying,
for example, that contract law exists for remedying palpable losses
induced by reasonable reliance on indications of intention or incurred
by bestowing a benefit in circumstances in which payment for it should
ensue.
In classical doctrine, the bargain, or expectation, interest in con-
tracts is recognized as real, and it predominates over the reliance and
benefit, or restitution, interests, which are also woven into the his-
toric texture of contract law. The latter interests tend not to be rec-
ognized by the classical theory when no proper contract stands behind
an act of reliance or the receipt of a benefit. When there is a contract
these interests are subsumed under the more general idea that the
parties are entitled to the equivalent of fulfillment from the magic
moment when minds meet. Under classical law, the model contract
is the pure executory contract, and the model breach is non-perfor-
mance of one of a pair of mutual promises, when the party who
figures as plaintiff in litigation has neither performed his side nor
acted in reliance to his detriment. The plaintiff in that situation is
entitled to damages measured as the difference between his monetary
position if the promise had been fulfilled and his present position,
and he is discharged from performance on his part. The contract is
not revocable unilaterally, even though the party on the other side
has not relied to his detriment before revocation is proposed.
If the law were to impose few restrictions on the content of agree-
ments, and if courts were to refuse to look behind agreed prices,
contracting could be quite free; but the other features of classical doc-
4. See pp. 1-7, 652-59 (several competing ideas support promissory liability).
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trine make for a still broader meaning of freedom. They subserve a
market society, in which the disposition of resources is left largely to
private planning by means of contract. Although a society with an
inactive state and few oppressive customary restraints on individual
choice-a fair enough description of England, in practice if not in
aspiration, for centuries before the nineteenth-can get on with dif-
ferent versions of contract law, the classical version promotes the ef-
ficiency of a private-market system by insuring that people can plan
confidently. If people calculate their interests wisely, they can count
on receiving the monetary benefit they have anticipated. They are
liberated from the danger that a co-planner, having changed his mind
or perceived his unwisdom, will plead that his reneging is harmless,
save to someone's incorporeal interest in being as sure as possible
about the future. They are also relieved of the danger that communal
mercy will intrude on certainty by coming to the aid of the miscalcu-
lating or hard-pressed.
With these freedoms, contracting becomes a means of voluntary
risk-allocation. People come under pressure to calculate carefully, both
because the distributional rewards go to those who can and do, and
because people are stuck with the private plans in which they col-
laborate. Individuals are both constrained and enabled to rely on
their own judgments: they are permitted to make their own decisions
as to what things are worth and compelled to take responsibility for
decisions looking to the future. Collective judgment can thus be
minimized, as the ideal of a market society holds it should be. Ac-
cording to that ideal, individuals interacting in the free pursuit of
whatever they value should for the most part determine the character
of the society they live in, and those least enamoured of the dominant
pattern should be free from political coercion by the numbers or the
wealth of those whose preferences create it.
II
The main burden of the first section of the book is to show that
the contract law of the nineteenth century was not in existence through
most of the eighteenth, that there is a true contrast between the old
law and the new. This requires taking on the commonplace that, in
consequence of the development of assumpsit, the informal executory
contract was in being around 1600, and the supposition that classical
contract law therefore did not have to be created later, but only put
to fuller use. For this purpose, Professor Atiyah has the resource of
another major recent book, Professor A. W. B. Simpson's A History of
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the Common Law of Contract,5 which deals with the later middle
ages and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The case for a true
contrast, which has a conceptual level and an applied level, is con-
vincing.
It is true that a promise was good consideration for a promise by
the early seventeenth century, and in that sense the executory con-
tract existed before it assumed its paradigmatic role. But there is
little sign through most of the eighteenth century that its existence
prompted courts to think that the will of the parties was a contract's
essence, that risk-allocation was a function of contracts, or that the
moral truism that promises should be kept was imperative for the
law's treatment of broken promises. It was not thought a good or a
right that projections embodied in contracts should be actualized;
rather, the assumption prevailed that good and right are embodied
in the law itself. The law was concerned with fulfilling, not private
intentions, but its own prescriptions, as well as moral duties not
clearly differentiated from legal ones by a pre-positivistic mentality.
The same point can be expressed by saying that the consideration
-at the time understood as the good reason for a promise, the reason
why it is intelligible and worthy of enforcement6-outweighed the
promise itself. Although a pre-existing legal or moral obligation to
do something is not the only good reason for promising to do it, that
is at least the best reason. If one is looking for dominant paradigms
by which lawyers conceive what contract law is about-with allow-
ance for the significant fact that it was not consciously conceived as
a distinct area of the law before the late eighteenth century-then
the old paradigm was the person who undertakes because in some
way he already owes.
Cases that do not fit can still be affected by a model case. When a
contract with a prior obligation behind it is broken, why and how a
court should act seem quite reasonably determined by the existence
and the nature of the prior obligation. The promise figures as
something like evidence-an analogy Professor Atiyah emphasizes 7-
a straight way to see that the prior obligation exists and to put a
value on it. Even when an executory promise is broken, the absence
of a prior obligation to examine need not mean that the law will turn
its focus away from its own categories of rights and wrongs towards
5. A. SiMPsoN, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1975).
6. See pp. 139-40 (recent observation that consideration meant good reason due to
Professor Simpson).
7. See pp. 143-46, 154-67, 216 (promise often played evidentiary role in law prior to
nineteenth century).
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what the parties seem to intend by promissory language, or that it
will attach social importance to the accomplishment of their project,
or to the fulfillment of expectations. It will be apt to think of remedy-
ing recognizable wrongs grounded in the law that prevailed before
parol executory contracts became actionable or in morality more home-
spun than that of fidelity to promises. It will ask whether someone
has been hurt by trusting reasonably and being deceived, and whether
someone has got something of value without paying. Here, too, the
promise may seem to be, not the thing violated, but a pointer to the
fact and to the precise character of a violation of a legal-moral right.
On the level of the courts' practice, there is strong, though compli-
cated, evidence that the mere existence of executory contracts did not
entail classical doctrine." Suits on contracts that were unperformed
on either side and unrelied on were rare. Discharge of the plaintiff's
duty to perform after a breach by the defendant was not standard law.
The right of a party to countermand a promise when the other party
had not performed on his side or relied on the promise was contro-
verted and ambiguously resolved, although by the end of the seven-
teenth century the better opinion was that there was no such right.
Here, as elsewhere, steps toward the classical law were taken over a
long period before its triumph.
There is some evidence of judicial disapproval of bargain damages.
More significantly, damages were a jury question. Although we are
therefore substantially ignorant of how damages were measured, it is
a good presumption that the recognized and approved power of juries
to mitigate damages usually operated against awarding the value of
bargains, in favor of sparing the contractor who was perceived as
outwitted, overcharged, or in a weak bargaining position. As the old
period faded into the new, increased judicial control over juries laid
the foundation for judicial formulation of the classical law. Of tech-
nical dilemmas making for the new order, the most important was
that arising in the case of a party obligated to perform first who has
attempted performance and been refused; in those circumstances, the
party almost has to be discharged from further duty and awarded the
difference between what he would have had if the contract had gone
through and what he has after performance is refused. The judicial
award of damages in that case furnished a model for those executory-
contract cases where the defendant's breach is not coordinated with
any performance, attempted performance, or reliance by the plaintiff.
In its wider aspects, Professor Atiyah's discussion of the eighteenth
8. See pp. 194-216.
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century brings out the interplay of contradictory phenomena, some
undermining the old law, others revealing its persistence. While an
inheritance of regulatory law directly limiting freedom of contract
was losing its hold, the Chancery occupied a central place in con-
tractual litigation and brought various equitable doctrines to bear on
it. Partly because wealth was still heavily in land, many important
transactions came under equity's powers to relieve against penalties
and otherwise to mitigate hardships arising from bad bargains. By
this means, the notion of just price effectively lived on, even as those
who reflected on the abstract features of the common law-especially
on its refusal to examine the adequacy of consideration-had ceased
to believe in it.
Classical theory was both articulated and criticized by intellectuals
before it, was embraced by the law. Hobbes has perhaps the strictest
claim to paternity: he asserted that a contract is definitionally a de-
termination of the parties' wills, whose obligatory force does not de-
rive from the law but is intrinsic to the contract. He advocated a
subjective theory of value, and had the rigor to deny that duress is
a valid contract defense-unless the state by the grace of its positive
laws chooses to make it one.9 From a different quarter of seventeenth-
century moral thought, Grotius argued for taking promises as such
seriously, and imparted that position to others in the modem natural
law tradition. 10
Before these views of the inherent force of promises influenced the
law significantly, they came under criticism by Hume. His conclusion
-that promise-keeping is only a useful convention, elevated to a duty
by the bad but benign human habit of rulemaking-anticipates the
substance, though not the mood, of the rule-utilitarianism that be-
came the principal philosophical support of classical contract law and
of its ethical postulates in the nineteenth century." Hume's criticism
of contractarian political theory was more successful in the intellectual
marketplace than his critique of a natural-law duty to keep promises.
Still, that school of political thought, chiefly represented in England
by Locke, contributed to an accretion of contract-mindedness, even
though the age was preoccupied, like Lockean theory itself, with prop-
erty. As Professor Atiyah argues, 12 the period's obsession with property
9. See pp. 41-44.
10. See pp. 140-41.
11. See pp. 52-57 (Hume had little direct influence on legal thought but anticipated
many of the ideas and arguments of nineteenth-century thought).
12. See pp. 85-90, 102-12 (recognition of property rights in many respects necessary
precursor to freedom of contract).
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rights actually helped prepare for the next period's way of conceiving
and valuing contractual rights; for protecting expectations and facili-
tating plans far into the future are what property law does, the more
so as it prunes qualifications from the right of dominion. In the law,
the influence of Lord Mansfield also worked on the whole toward
the future-by way, for example, of his respect in various contexts
for individual's intentions, an attitude at odds with the old tendency
to say so much the worse for intentions if they are not fitted to the
forms provided by the law.13
The balance of countervailing forces at the end of the first era
bears a strong resemblance, Professor Atiyah points out,14 to the state
of the same era's criminal law, which was draconian but tempered by
mercy. The elements of classical doctrine were so close to synthesis
that the public was threatened with strict responsibility for promises.
Thereby it was motivated to be more enlightened in the pursuit of
self-interest than traditional habits encouraged, to make and keep
promises with greater care, and to contribute to order in a minimally
governed society. But corresponding to the pardons and commutations
of criminal law, procedures to evade a bad bargain, subject to some
risk and expense, remained available.
III
Although it is in the background parts of the central section, which
covers the period from 1770 to 1870, that the book is most outstanding
as a portrait of an age, I shall slight the details of this section in order
to concentrate on the shaping theme of rise and fall. Transitional
between the background and the law is the important argument that
classical contract doctrine was a purer distillation of the ideal of a
self-regulating society than can be found in reality. In making this
argument, Professor Atiyah takes to task A. V. Dicey's influential Law
and Public Opinion in England during the 19th Century'5 for rep-
resenting the high-Victorian years as more a time of laissez-faire, in
dogma and in practice, than they were, and for the further error of
seeing laissez-faire as the lengthened shadow of Bentham. Utilitarian-
ism was, if anything, more significant as the source of faith in legis-
13. See pp. 120-25, 162-64, 190-91 (primacy of intentions in contract law largely due
to Mansfield).
14. Pp. 189-93 (enforcement of contractual duties shared many characteristics with
criminal law).
15. A. DICEY, LEcTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENG-
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1905); see pp. 231-37.
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lation and in the management of society for aggregate ends than it
was for the individualistic, non-interventionist conclusions it shared
with the political economists, who were themselves only qualified
proponents of laissez-faire. While classical contract law was being
worked out, the modem state was in the process of creation. Before
the process was complete, a great deal of legislation infringed freedom
of contract and enlarged the role of public authority. In collaboration
with such instincts and strains of ideology as humanitarian revulsion
from the costs of industrial growth and from the kind of people who
thrive on ruthless individualism, and with habits of social thought
formed in an earlier age-all of which found easy expression in the
still old-fashioned, aristocratic political system-utilitarianism contrib-
uted to a strong counter-current to the ideas that increasingly informed
the law.
Professor Atiyah does not, however, depict the private law as a
parody of contemporary social thought, unfunctional because it was
unrepresentative of the historical continuum in its complexity. Much
less does he depict it as the captive of special interests with a stake in
laissez-faire, devoting itself to their service while the public interest
struggled with some success for recognition in the forums of politics
and of public opinion. On the contrary, he argues that the classical
contract law was the more functional for being a somewhat puristic
elaboration of certain implications of political economy.
The fundamental reason is that over the first half of the nineteenth
century, the need of all classes to depend on the market was stronger
than the conviction, in public opinion as a whole, that such depen-
dence is desirable. However market organization and administrative
organization compare sub specie aeternitatis, it took generations for
the information and skills to accumulate that would permit adminis-
trative planning to become either a rival for hegemony or the major
supplement to the market that it was becoming in both aspiration and
experiment-at a time when substantial, if not unbounded, confidence
in the market was most widespread among the educated. Besides
building a law of contracts on the implicit premise that perfecting
a mechanism for private planning was the courts' most constructive
calling, the judges contributed to making human beings more com-
petent members of a self-regulating society.
Innumerable people, for the most part among the poor, had no
experience or education to fit them for life in the world of the indus-
trial revolution as it unintentionally and unpreventably became, much
less for life in an ideal world of individual effort harmonized for the
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improvement of all lots. A slow process of education and discipline
went into teaching people-not only the poor-to pay debts, to take
care in their dealings, to discover the strategies of self-improvement
that were within their reach, and to determine the risks they were
willing to run. The stern pedagogy of contract law was among the
educative influences. By 1870, the populace was much better prepared
to take care of itself in a competitive environment than it was a half-
century earlier, most of all because it was much wealthier, but also
because it was trained for survival in the earlier kind of world, train-
ing that simultaneously prepared it to envision a world of a different
kind.
The technical part of the book's second section,1 6 which I can do
little more than commend, begins with a discussion of the steps by
which, and the emphasis and purposiveness with which, the essentials
of classical doctrine came to be the law; it then describes the numerous
corollaries generated from the elements by the mixture of logic and
teleological compatibility that characterizes legal thinking when it is
in the grip of an idea. As Professor Atiyah covers what happened in
the various departments of contract law, he develops one theme that
unifies many particulars. That is the propensity of nineteenth-century
jurisprudence for abstraction, for principle in a sense more properly
analogous to the models of science than to the axioms of geometry.
Scientific models propose, not to represent factual reality, but to derive
from the assumptions of the system statements that can be checked
against observable fact. Law can be conceived as the analogous pre-
scriptive pursuit, aimed at affecting reality rather than predicting
what it will reveal; like science, it cannot pursue its end efficiently
if it bogs down in an attempt to take account of all the facts. Because
it was implicitly so conceived, classical contract law can be caught in
a posture that, from one point of view that has gained ground since
1870, easily seems ridiculous-the posture of looking at a litigation
situation, where some human arrangement has gone wrong and peo-
ple are in dispute, and asking, not what did happen, but what should
or might have happened.
The posture, however, is not folly. It should not be confused with
the formalism that supposes legal ideas to have a life of their own and
to lock up inevitable entailments, without reference to ethics or to
judges' choices of one social goal over another. Such formalism, which
is irreducible folly, figures as a symptom of the law's post-classical de-
tachment from its milieu of values and institutions. The Victorian
16. Pp. 398-568.
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lawyer's addiction to principle' 7-which reflects a cultural fascination
with the "man of principle" as a moral type, a type that becomes
troubling when one asks "does it matter what principles?"-was highly
integrated with a commitment to certain values and social goals. The
point of asking "ought" questions in a sub-moral sense was to push
conduct toward what it ought to be in virtue of a prescriptive judg-
ment, whether primarily moral or primarily practical. The disciplinary
effect of contract law is again crucial. The function of civil law was
thought to be, like that of criminal law, not primarily the more or
less fair resolution of particular situations of breakdown and conflict,
but the motivation of future behavior of both the parties and the
public.
One will learn to be explicit about the risks one agrees to assume
if the law on the whole construes silences and ambiguities in contrac-
tual terms in favor of a party who might have understood the promise
at issue as a guarantee against frustration or mistake, whether or not
insurance against misadventure or changes in information actually
figured in the parties' negotiations. Effort to inform oneself about the
quality of things bought will be stimulated if the law holds that a
taciturn seller-or even one flirting with fraud more vocally-might
have supposed that the buyer has made his own investigation, whether
or not the seller really supposed any such thing. On another level, the
very conditioned reflex that promises are made to be kept, that one
is not free to change one's mind in exchange for mere compensation
for any reliance losses incurred, is in part a matter of having learned
to respect the benefits that accrue to oneself and society from classical
law-even when it is immediately beneficial to escape a particular en-
gagement. In other words, rule-utilitarianism-the prevalent support,
tacit or articulated, of classical doctrine in nineteenth-century Eng-
land'-attempts to say that certain conduct is always obligatory be-
cause of its tendency.
It is necessarily speculative whether an act whose tendency is thought
to serve aggregate utility would in fact be seen to serve it if the con-
crete utilities of particular acts could be added up. In the end, by
imputing visions to parties who never had them-all the while genu-
flecting to the parties' will-the courts imputed utility to the conduct
they encouraged. Such imputation of unreal intentions is a necessary
17. See pp. 345-58 (period from 1770 to 1870 dominated by commitment to principles
in ethics, politics, law, and other realms of thought).
18. See pp. 324-58 (rule-utilitarianism of Bentham, Mill, and others, which combined
utilitarian ideas and ideas of classical economics with recognition of importance of prin-
ciples, provided conceptual foundation for classical doctrine).
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part of contract law. What determines which intentions to impute
is judicial policy, and that policy in the nineteenth century was to
promote a judicial vision of a world ruled by private decisionmaking
and the price mechanism.
Professor Atiyah's detailed treatment of the classical law is of ne-
cessity partly an account of anomalies with historical and practical ex-
planations. The new law was encumbered with the old, and with
varying degrees of awkwardness it had to accommodate to its paradigms
and purposes many ideas evolved in an earlier intellectual environ-
ment-among them consideration, the reliance and restitution inter-
ests, and equitable doctrines. Common sense and case law could not
be perfectly classicized.
One special oddity-on the policy level, rather than on the con-
ceptual level-is the contract in restraint of trade.19 Nineteenth-century
courts were generally indulgent toward restrictive agreements. Free-
dom of contract prevailed even when the object of the contract was
to foreclose a class of potential dealings. Restrictive intentions were
respected by courts more capable than they may have realized of pre-
ferring social utility to clear and present intentions. Professor Atiyah
shows that the courts were right in their economics; he thereby adds
to his case that economic teachings fed the law in a way they ceased
to in the ensuing period. With the decentralized structure of nine-
teenth-century business, there was little danger that petty monopolistic
agreements would impose monopoly prices, and this was perceived.
Even after 1870, however, when trade associations and unions intro-
duced a serious element of monopoly into the British economy, cov-
enants in restraint of trade continued to be indulged. The inheritance
from the nineteenth century was not innocuous then, but the will to
resistance came slowly in an atmosphere where competition and in-
dividualism were increasingly denied value even as ideals.
IV
Professor Atiyah devotes much of the book's third section, which
covers the pe-iod from 1870 to the present, to the massive record of
legislation by which democratic governments since 1870 have abridged
freedom of contract. 20 The prevalence of legislation with that direct
effect and of redistributive legislation, as well as the state's assump-
tion of a large immediate role in the economy, imply that majority
19. See pp. 408-12, 451, 528-33, 697-703.
20. Developments in English law and society that restricted freedom of contract are
described throughout the book's third section. Pp. 571-779.
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opinion has fallen progressively out of sympathy with the ideals of
the nineteenth-century system and with conspicuous parts of its ethi-
cal constellation. Distributive equality seems to be a widely approved
goal, subject to the need to sacrifice some of it to the social exploita-
tion of private incentive-though rather less than would once have
been thought a wise sacrifice in the long run. The ethic of entitlement
to gains earned by trading in the market, once a strong supplement
to resignation to inequality for instrumental reasons, has lost ground
to the feeling that society should not tolerate the results of unequal
starting points for the trading process as the lottery of nature or the
price of civilization. Bargaining has ceased to feel fair when either
the initial positions of the parties, or those gained through previous
transactions, are unequal, and therefore various kinds of contracting
have come under regulatory legislation. From arguably the best way
of arriving at decisions that must be made by collectivities, majority
rule seems to have become a source of positive value, lending justifi-
cation to the making of more and more social determinations by
political means. Yet the implications of legislation for the private
law of contracts are not self-evident. The economy remains mixed,
and not all life affected by contracting is commercial. Although leg-
islation forbids some contracts, requires others, and alters the distrib-
utive results of contracting in many circumstances, it does not follow
from this alone that classical doctrine no longer serves society's pur-
poses in the area left to freedom and to the common law.
Professor Atiyah looks beyond the enacted law for changes that
cast further doubt on the classical law's claim to be functional as the
basic type of contract law. (A claim to practical usefulness as only a
part Qf the law is something else: for example, the classical theory of
how to measure damages would sometimes be convenient even if the
classical theory of what damage is were abandoned; and there is a
place for speculative activities, when they are clearly undertaken, that
can be carried on only under the classical rules.) For one thing, the
opportunity for contracting has declined. Apart from the existence
of cartels, direct legislative bars to some contracts, and the govern-
ment's large share of the economy as a whole, the private sector of
the economy has come to be occupied by many fewer and much larger
companies, proportionately, than in the 1770-to-1870 period.21 Non-
legislated social decisions once made by contracts between independent
businesses are now made by the administrative process within big
21. See pp. 592-601 (present period characterized by mixed economy and corporate
state).
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businesses and government agencies. These concerns may seek the
same end of efficiency as small businesses, and may simulate internally
the results that would be arrived at by contracting, but they do not
make contracts with themselves. The law has done only a little with
the possibility of endowing intra-organizational arrangements with
some of the properties of contracts. Although the giants contract with
each other, their relationships are continuing and their deals complex.
When something goes wrong, they are more interested in an adjust-
ment than in realizing a gain that one side was shrewd or fortunate
enough to bargain for.
Again, the implications of change for the law are not obvious. It
is arguable that even after size has reduced the scope for contract, a
significant part of the economy remains. If contract under classical
law ever had advantages as an ordering mechanism, it has them still.
Yet one may wonder whether having admitted the advantages of the
classical law, its preservation would be compelling if the impact of
one or another kind of contract law on total economic performance
eventually came to seem marginal. The importance accorded to a
marginal effect, apart from its size, would depend on the strength
of other pressures to maintain or depart from classical law.
Developments other than the reduction in the number of social de-
cisions that can be made by contract also have a tendency to diminish
demand for such a product as classical law. The public tends to want
contracts that can be cancelled unilaterally. In some circumstances,
contracting on any other terms is debarred by legislation. It becomes
plausible to read a unilateral-cancellation term into contracts where
they are less than unmistakably present and to assess only reliance
damages for cancellation, or those pre-assessed by the institution of
forfeitable deposits. Even if that were not the courts' propensity-ex-
plained perhaps by their guessing at parties' probable intentions-the
mere incidence of contracts written to permit the application of classi-
cal doctrine would be reduced. The expectation of changed conditions,
such as high but uncertain inflation, means that contracts are com-
monly withdrawn from the purview of traditional law by express
provision for renegotiation or specification of values later on. Betting
on markets is a specialized pursuit; it is no longer a feature of normal
business.
From everyday impressions and intellectual sources, Professor Atiyah
puts together many indications that value changes have occurred-
changes directly connected with promissory behavior as well as those
to which legislative and political history testify most clearly. He sees
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signs that, despite the cloistered reverence of some philosophers for
promise-keeping,2 2 the ethics of the world have become bounded by
what the law calls reliance and restitution interests. The right to
change one's mind seems more obviously valuable than the power to
make commitments that are binding in a future when one's self may
be as different as all else. Popular moral sentiment, Professor Atiyah
thinks, has in effect collapsed rule-utilitarianism according to its
logical deserts.
A kind of individualism and a kind of collectivism combine in the
new sensibility. To judge by remote tendency, rather than by utilities
visible enough to be put on the scales, seems absurd in itself, and the
right to assess an individual's act seems in the first instance his own.
Neutral judgment, which is perhaps naturally likely to type the act
and to consider its tendency, is at any rate postponed by a rebuttable
deference to the actor's own judgment, which is apt to be formed by
palpable utilities assessed by some mixture of intuition with delibera-
tion, and whose appyoval of the act is evidenced by its very doing.
Internalization of the neutral point of view is not the mark of a
moral man; the "man of principle" in the old sense has fallen out
of favor.23 On the other hand, when doubt or disagreement requires
appeal to a public standard-at which point one is only a step from
the law-the appeal is to what society would think a "reasonable"
valuation of the concrete act and of its near consequences. Strictly in-
dividualistic recoil from the suggestion that what something is worth
to a particular person may meaningfully be addressed by anyone else
is no more instinctive than attraction to rules-justified by utilitarian
tendency if their justification is put on utilitarian grounds at all-as
the only possible ground for an outside opinion.
Professor Atiyah's main point about lawyers' law in the recent pe-
riod is that it has not developed in step with its surroundings. 24 The
considerable extent to which it has finally fallen into line in practice
is not reflected in a recast theory of contracts to replace the classical
model. Some of the practical adaptation has been mediated through
general jurisprudence. The full investigation of the facts, a distrust of
rules, an indulgence for discretion, a conception of the judicial goal
as a just solution of the particular case, a perception of the case that
is litigated both in contract and in tort as an accident to be set right
22. See pp. 652-59.
23. See pp. 649-59 (nineteenth-century age of principles succeeded by twentieth-century
age of pragmatism).
24. See pp. 693-715 (classical model, unlike statutes and individual court decisions,
fails to recognize economic, social, and institutional realities).
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rather than as an occasion to propound standards and to furnish in-
centives to the public-all these modern trends in adjudication mili-
tate against the felt purposes and crucial techniques of classical con-
tract law. Though numerous other interstitial deviations are also
discussed in the book, the most important direct evidence of departure
from the classical law appears in the elevation of the reliance and
benefit interests from their earlier subordinate position. 25
Professor Atiyah intends to write another book on the philosophic
and analytic problems of contract, a book that will address the need
for a new theory. He will certainly combat in that work the form of
captivity to the classical model that does not dispute results that
nineteenth-century law would have disapproved-for example, the in-
creased recognition of a duty to pay for benefits one has not solicited
by an agreement to purchase-but that does dispute their classification
under contract law. Over history, law that deals with promissory be-
havior has not always been conceived as distinct from law that con-
cerns itself with reliance, benefits, or communal standards of fairness.
If there are analytic advantages in keeping those subjects together,
pre-classical law shows that it has been done. The classical period did
not discover a properly contractual realm that exists by metaphysical
necessity and go on to exclude intruders; rather, it developed rules
of law and an exclusionary conceptual framework in a specific context
and for specific purposes. This is clearly the logic of Professor Atiyah's
writing history first and theory second.
In reviewing this book, one is conscious of the necessity to abstract
from its detailed information and from Professor Atiyah's extraordi-
nary mastery of literature from many fields, and to do little more than
suggest the complex intelligence of his reflections. Definitiveness is
not the virtue of books on such a scale and so alive with thought.
Professor Atiyah has almost singlehandedly created nineteenth-century
legal history in the mainstream of general history. (For earlier times,
especially the middle ages, the historiographic tradition is much
stronger.) The book will surely be a stimulus to further research and
analysis. Because the subject bridges the Atlantic, American as well
as English legal history will draw sustenance from Professor Atiyah's
ideas.
25. See pp. 764-78.
Community and Law in Seventeenth-
Century Massachusetts
Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts. By David T. Konig. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979. Pp. xxi, 215. $21.00.
Reviewed by Barbara A. Blackt
The Puritans who founded Massachusetts Bay were faced, according
to David Konig, with the cruel clash of ideal and actual.1 Against the
vision of a society based on communalism, both religiously and secu-
larly inspired, they were forced to set the reality of community conflict
stubbornly resistant to community resolution. Disputes were, ideally
at least, to be settled by communal institutions. Decision by town
meeting, congregational vote, brotherly suasion, neighborly persuasion,
collective discipline, arbitration and the like: these, rather than the
external and coercive power of the state exercised through courts, were
to be the primary modes of dispute resolution. The colonists, however,
recognized-if they did not embrace-reality. They had courts from the
beginning, and they used them. But communalism was the "paradigm."
And communalism failed.
Konig observes that historians have noted both the communal ideal
and its collapse, but "existing interpretations leave the social and cul-
tural development of Massachusetts at that point of collapse, or they
view the rest of the seventeenth century as either a continued decline
from orthodoxy or a drift with no direction."'2 Led astray by facile
assumptions about law in general and litigation in particular, these
offending historians have been kept from "asking questions of legal
records as they pertain to the writing of history." 3 Noting the high rate
of legal conflict, they have seen it "as merely another type of social
pathology symptomatic of social divisiveness, unrestrained economic
competition, or the total collapse of any coherent social ideology." 4
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They have adopted, it seems, a simple-minded correlation of litigation
with trouble, with a consequent view of courts as "a desperate last
resort," with neither reach nor grasp higher than the containment of
aggressiveness.5 Konig dismisses this myopic perspective, and substitutes
for it a complex, anthropologically validated, 6 thesis of law as a positive
force. Litigation, in turn adaptive, coordinative, integrative, is-and
was-in all "a useful agent of orderly and desirable social change,"
"helping to create a new paradigm for the establishment of stable
community life." Sue thy neighbor!
Konig's thesis places him squarely in the excellent company of those
who would study change. He has limited his investigation to a single
county of the Bay Colony, a focus reflected in heavy reliance on the
records of the Essex County Court.8 This approach is deliberately in-
novative; we have colony-wide and town-narrow'0 monographic studies
in profusion, but none that I know of for the seventeenth century con-
centrating on one county." A new angle of vision must and does prove
enlightening. There are drawbacks to this, as to all, approaches, but
Konig nicely skirts the most obvious peril by limiting his conclusions,
with his research, to Essex. In the event, the county is in more than
one sense a happy medium.
I. The Changing Shape of Conflict: Society's Demand
Konig's concern is "not only to examine the internal development
of legal doctrine and procedure, but also to discover the demands that
social, economic, and political contingencies placed on legal institutions
5. Id.
6. P. xiii n.9.
7. P. xiii.
8. In 1636, Massachusetts established four "Inferiour Quarterly Courts," held at Salem,
Ipswich, Newtowne (Cambridge), and Boston. Some time after the division of the colony
into four counties, in 1643, these courts came to be held in and for the counties and
re-titled county courts. In newer counties, judicial arrangements tended to be more com-
plex. G. HASKINS, LAw AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETrS 32-33 (1960).
9. See, e.g., P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (2d ed.
1954); E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA (1958); S. MORISON, BUILDERS OF THE BAY
COLONY (rev. ed. 1964). Studies of the legal system have also tended to focus on the col-
ony as a whole. See, e.g., G. HASKINS, supra note 8; E. POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN EARLY MASSACHUSETrS, 1620-1692 (1966).
10. See, e.g., P. GREVEN, FOUR GENERATIONS (1970) (Andover); K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW
ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1970) (Dedham); S. POWELL, PURITAN VILLAGE
(1963) (Sudbury); D. RtrnMAN, WINTHROP'S BOSTON (1965) (Boston).
11. There are, however, two excellent introductions to published records of county
courts. See Chafee, Introduction, Records of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1680, 29
PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS (COLLECTIONS) xvii (1933); Smith,
Legal and Historical Introduction to the Pynchon Court Record, in COLONIAL JUSTICE IN
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1639-1702) 3 (J. Smith ed. 1961).
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and how those institutions changed in order to become so important
in society."' 12 In short, the circumstances, and therefore the demands,
of the 1670s were different from those of the 1630s. Konig is not, of
course, saying that there were no conflicts at first, but only that there
was something different about the later conflicts. The differences them-
selves differed, 13 but in one respect the later conflicts were identical-
they led people to court. And if you are looking for an imaginative,
informed, intelligent study of the roots of those conflicts which cul-
minated in litigation, this is it.
Konig's chapter on real property litigation is a fine example.1 4 At
the beginning we find a society whose land-population ratio lulled the
populace, permitting and even encouraging casual treatment of matters
of title and boundaries. Neighborliness, deference, and trust added
their portion, working a comforting assurance that there was no need
either for formality or for precision. Konig makes us feel the early days
and lax ways, the improvidence which left the reckoning to later gen-
erations-an angle on these folk which the reader is likely to find
fascinating and surprising. With an emerging land shortage, very nat-
urally attitudes changed, casualness giving way to care, prodigality to
prudence, charity to chariness. Result, conflict.
Similarly, "as towns gTew larger and commerce expanded, Essex was
becoming less of a face-to-face society capable of sustaining any sort
of communalism."'1 The loss of an essential similarity, if not identity,
of interest brought people to court, seeking, consciously or otherwise,
the coordinative function of the courts. Konig does good work here
on absentee landowners, on the "Jerseymen," and on the mercantile
community. And then there is a truly splendid treatment of non-
commercial debt-the "neighborly loan."' 6 His careful analysis of sued-
for and unsued-for debt reveals that distance was the operative factor,
suggesting that, in this area at least, if it could have been kept close,
it could have been kept out of court.
Konig, operating on an assumption of colonial preference for the
communal, naturally explores the possibilities of conflict resolution
by town meeting and the like-of resolution, that is, without resort
to "outside mechanisms" such as the county court. Since the people
12. P. xiv.
13. See p. 236 infra.
14. Pp. 35-63 (chapter 2). Part of this chapter originally appeared as Konig, Com-
munity Custom and the Common Law: Social Change and the Development of Land Law
in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 18 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 137 (1974).
15. P. 65. For this topic see pp. 64-88, part of which appeared earlier as Konig, A
New Look at the Essex "French": Ethnic Frictions and Community Tensions in Seven-
teenth-Century Essex County, Massachusetts, 110 EssEX INST. HIST. CoLLErTiONS 167 (1974).
16. Pp. 82-88.
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involved did go to court when, by hypothesis, they preferred not to,
this inquiry is in large part a search for the deficiencies of communal
mechanisms and a compilation of the comparative advantages of liti-
gation. Thus, for example, as to real property, "Essex landowners
might have sought guidance from their town meetings,"' 7 but they
did not. Why not? The obvious answers, given, are that the town
meeting had no jurisdiction over title actions, and that the sanctions
of the county court were "markedly more effective."' s But Konig
looks deeper, and finds deficiencies which, unlike these deliberately
imposed limitations, might be thought of as congenital, and thus
irremediable:
Scenes... occurred because at a town meeting every voter had to
take sides publicly when the issue came to a full vote. Blame and
recrimination were inevitable by-products of mandatory taking of
sides in emotional cases, but settlement in court helped reduce
these dangers. In the first place, only those persons who were in-
volved in the dispute or who wanted to take sides came to court.
... In addition, the final decision was made by a relatively im-
partial third-party institution, removed from the jealousies and
rivalries of town politics. 19
In later chapters Konig charts the downward course of church, arbi-
tration, and collective discipline. He identifies, and depicts in rich
detail, the societal developments which exposed the weaknesses of
these institutions, weaknesses which, according to the author, explain
the supersession of the desired communal by the effective legal. He
points to the rise of congregational dissension and the decline of
ministerial influence; 20 adding a new ingredient to this familiar mix
and blending well, Konig comes up with a new role for the courts.
From the beginning, he reminds us, state support of the church, and
harmony between the two, were assumed. But a new interest in per-
sonal liberty took hold, and by the 1650s,
Essex ... was beginning to move toward the position that certain
personal liberties were to be protected as zealously as the church-
in fact, that they might have to be protected from the church.
The courts were the source of that protection, for it was there
that individuals could defend their personal liberties against a
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Konig describes and documents a swell of resistance to arbitration,
in the form of refusals, once unknown, to abide by the decisions of
arbitrators.
22
And finally, turning to "the neighborly regulation of private be-
havior," he reports the virtual disappearance of a sense of collective
responsibility for personal conduct. He has no doubt that, at the first,
"collective discipline was part of the communal paradigm," and that
"[t]his view had changed by 1682,"'23 but he is sensitive both to the
desirability of documenting the change by a "valid quantitative com-
parison between chronological periods, ' 24 and to the difficulty of
obtaining quantifiable evidence of neighborly watchfulness-not to
mention its effectiveness-early or late. He thus turns, perforce, to
"suggestive evidence of a qualitative nature";25 his marshaling and
presentation of this evidence are a model of imaginative scholarship.
Finding increasing reluctance to meddle in the affairs of others, Konig
detects a move to "a social ethic for a post-revolutionary Puritan so-
ciety, ' 26 an ethic which, by recognizing that "[s]aint and sinner now
had to live in the same society," withdrew the essential legitimating
support for collective discipline. Replacing the once-despised " 'civil
man' ... as an object of resentment and a source of tension was the
censorious meddler who pried into the private affairs of neighbors
in order to ferret out deviance.'
'2 7
The reader may note that the economic, social, and cultural changes
which produced the new demand are by no means all-of-a-piece. Popu-
lation dispersal, increasing heterogeneity, commercialization, and the
like are very different from attitudinal change. There is, moreover,
a difference between such attitudinal change as loss of piety, or trust,
and the attitudinal shift of Konig's central thesis-the shift from the
communal to the legal paradigm. Further exploration of the complex
relationships within this intricate network of change might be prof-
itable, 28 but Konig's treatment of this aspect of his subject is richly






27. P. 133. The "civil man" behaved according to accepted standards but lacked in-
ward grace. P. 130.
28. Similarly, when we find suits over title to land where at first there were no such
suits, suits brought against the very community which was itself, earlier, the preferred
locus of dispute resolution, and so forth, are we dealing with qualitative or quantitative
change? The question of overall per capita litigation rate in Essex is not directly ad-
dressed. It appears to have increased, see pp. xi-xii, 27, but if it remained static, then
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II. The Changing Set of Mind: Paradigms Old and New
My difficulty with Konig's thesis of a changing paradigm is not
the new paradigm, but its alleged newness-or, put another way, the
old paradigm. Without denying the colonists a communal ideal, I dis-
sent from Konig's version of their communal ideal.
The "communal ideal" presumably refers to belief in the desirabil-
ity of avoiding and resolving controversy without taking leave of
mechanisms and institutions whose effectiveness rests on the imme-
diately consensual, rather than on the remote consensuality of state
coercion. That ideal29 we may safely ascribe to the colonists. But the
faintly hopeful no less than the grimly determined may be said to
be possessed of an ideal. The question is, with what force? And that
varies with the idealists' assessment of feasibility and degree of distaste
for the alternative. Konig seems to me to overdraw both of these,
coming close to a picture of the founders as innocents, and reading
into colonial attitudes toward law a reluctance based on ignorance
and bordering on aversion.30 Closely, and perhaps causally, related to
this is a picture of the founding of Massachusetts Bay 3' with which I
disagree most emphatically.
A. The Founding
Konig's account of the founding of the Bay Colony rests most
solidly on his belief that, in their institution of a legal system, the
colonists transplanted English institutions.32 Now it is some time
since anyone has been disposed to deny that the colonists' English
heritage had something to do with the lives they led and the insti-
tutions they created. But Konig overdoes the imitative and underplays
the innovative. 33 On the other hand, whatever the cogency of this
the increase in certain types of lawsuits must have been offset by a decrease in other
types. Cf. K. ERiKsON, WVAYWARD PURITANS (1966) (work on constancy of deviance in co-
lonial Massachusetts).
29. See, e.g., K. LocsrmE, supra note 10, at 6; D. RUTMAN, supra note 10, at 154, 233.
30. See, e.g., pp. 29, 188. But see p. 34.
31. Pp. 3-38.
32. See, e.g., pp. xiv, 3-4, 18, 22, 32-33.
33. Thus, he asserts, in a fascinating bit of revisionism, that "English corporate prac-
tices dictated the general course," p. 22, challenging the dogma that the founders set out
to create a commonwealth and substituting the thesis that their model was the English
borough corporation. Here Konig relies in part on the theory that the colonists, although
not staying within the specific limits of their own charter, "did nothing that they could
not later defend, if necessary, as being generally accepted corporate practice in England."
P. 24. This is incorrect, or Pickwickian. No corporation had power over felony, which
carried the death penalty, without an express grant in its charter. There is no such
provision in the Massachusetts charter. Konig's piercing of the commonwealth veil is
creative, not to say devastatingly plausible. Even thinking him wrong, I wonder if he
is rightl
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criticism, it is impossible not to admire the ingenuity and skill dis-
played in Konig's synthesis of English and Massachusetts history. Spe-
cialists in American Revolutionary history are familiar with the theory
that American political history recapitulated English political history:
eighteenth-century America rings familiar to the historian of Stuart
England; the Glorious Revolution, as we have been told, was fought
twice, once in England, once in America. Now, in a striking adapta-
tion of this approach, Konig's Massachusetts history recapitulates
Konig's English history.
In sketching the English background, Konig harks back to a medi-
eval communalism, to its disappearance in consequence of the weak-
ness of communal institutions, and finally to its replacement by more
effective state institutions.34 Local courts-those of manor and village,
of hundred and county-dwindled in significance in the face of soci-
ety's transformation "'from a hierarchy of communities to the agglom-
eration of equal competing individuals depicted in Leviathan.' "3
As they declined, institutions of royal justice rose, preeminently the
justice of the peace, a figure of ever-growing importance to English
law and life. And what is more, Konig identifies a specifically Puritan
attachment to this personage in the early seventeenth century. De-
spite his position as servant of a monarch given to harassing Puritans,
the justice of the peace protected, and was respected and trusted by,
Puritans.3 6
Gazing westward in 1629, we find an attempt to revive ancient,
once-failed communalism.3 7 Once again weak communal institutions
fail to sustain a society whose growth and increasing complexity bring
problems requiring strong, external, coercive institutions for their
resolution. Here, too, experience with these legal institutions leads
finally to trust, and to the awareness that law can provide the founda-
tion for a stable and harmonious society. The parallelism is neat as
well as inspired; it is also, in my view, exaggerated, and based on
misplaced emphases in English history.38 As a result, inter alia, the
justice of the peace and the county loom far larger in Konig's Massa-
chusetts than ever they did in John Winthrop's Massachusetts.
According to our author, the colonists, aware of the need for outside
34. Pp. 5-16.
35. P. 9 (quoting C. HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND
487 (1964)).
36. Pp. 13-18.
37. Pp. 18, 188.
38. The attachment of English law reformers was not to the justice of the peace as
such but to local, speedy, effective, and inexpensive justice. See, e.g., p. 18 (quoting Hugh
Peter's reform proposal); see note 39 infra.
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mechanisms of support, turn to the natural model-the justice of the
peace. And Konig buckles down to the task of transforming the Mas-
sachusetts magistrate into a justice of the peace, intricately and in-
geniously confounding the two.30 This picture of the Massachusetts
magistrate is an error whose significance it is hard to overstate: the
Massachusetts magistrate is the key to Massachusetts attitudes toward
law, and misperception of the one guarantees confusion about the
other.
Sensitivity to law, and a perception of the ultimate triumph of
legalism, might well lead an author to the county and the justice of
the peace. The county is associated with the external force of state
coercion, or, in other words, with law,40 and the English justice of
the peace may be thought of as a county official.41 But there is a
paradox at work here, because the metamorphosis of magistrate into
justice of the peace actually reduces the magistrate in stature, and
makes possible Konig's stress, for the early years, on the externality
and distance of magistrate from people. Since the magistrate is symbol
as well as servant and representative of law, the effect is to minimize
the role of law for those early years, which is, of course, what Konig
believes the record demands for the heyday of the communal ideal.
If the magistrate is the key to attitudes about law, then we must
find the key to the magistrate, and it is neither his peripheral resem-
blance to the justice of the peace nor his adventitious county-ness.
The key is his status as ruler of the colony, constitutionally invested
with the "three-fold power of magistraticall authority," 42 an authority
pervading every level, as well as function, of government and making
of the magistrate a figure both unique and towering.43 It is wrong
39. Only some assistants, called by Konig "assistants/justices of the peace," were given
the powers of the justice of the peace, sub nomine, in 1630, and that was short-lived.
The terms "sessions," see pp. 93, 116 n.76, 120 n.15, and "commission of the peace," see
p. 36, used by Konig, were not in general use in the colony during the first charter period.
Konig makes much of resemblances that mean nothing, see, e.g., p. 32 ("like quarter ses-
sions, its terms were held at similar times of the year"), and little of crucial distinc-
tions: "The civil jurisdiction of the quarterly courts was a novelty for justices of the
peace (who soon came to be known simply as 'magistrates' in Massachusetts), but it also
had English impulses behind it," p. 33. It embodied the "reformist desire ... to confer
such authority on the justices." Id.; but see note 38 supra.
40. The town, in contrast, is associated with communalism. It is a "subtheme" of this
book that the town in Massachusetts was less important than historians have believed,
and the county more so. P. xiv.
41. The justice of the peace is of course a royal official, but with county-wide juris-
diction under a commission of the peace for the county.
42. "[L]egislative, judicative, & consultative or directive of the public affairs of the
country .. " 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUsETrs BAY
iN NEW ENGLtIND 92 (N. Shurtleff ed. 1853) (converted to modern spelling).
43. Konig knows this, and discusses the related point of early centralization, see pp.
20-21, but this awareness seems to have little if any operative effect on the work.
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to picture the magistrate as external to, however supportive of, the
mission and meaning of the enterprise, and short-sighted to see the
magistrate as a figure whose intervention spelled defeat for a dominant
ideal. 44 In exploration of attitudes toward the magistrate, it is dan-
gerous to view him only as a judge; if, for other and better purposes,
that must nevertheless be done, it is distortive to think of him only as
a county judge. The founders of Massachusetts are said to have had
an "impulse toward county magistracy," 45 and the magistrates to have
identified themselves, even when acting on the town level, with the
county judiciary.4 6 Neither proposition seems to me supportable; cer-
tainly the support offered for them is wispy. The magistrates were the
judges of the colony-constitutionally so ordained, it was believed-
and they adjudicated at every level-town, county, colony. The low,
the middle, and the high justice were theirs, and if we have any rea-
son to guess-we have none to believe-that they thought of themselves
more as judges of one level than another, surely it would be the colony
level. Magistrates alone sat on the highest regular tribunal of justice,
the colony-wide Court of Assistants.
The county court was, of course, a busy and important court, but
the most important matters went either originally or on appeal to the
Court of Assistants or the General Court or both. Konig sets up a
kind of town-county--communal-legal-rivalry, and suggests, among
other things, that the county courts were set up to keep the towns
under wraps.4 7 But there is no evidence of this. In 1636 the single
Court of Assistants was the only regular judicial tribunal; obviously
a growing and expanding, and from the first litigious, colony needed
more, and more readily available, judicial tribunals. The county itself
was nothing more than an obvious, convenient unit of administration.
There was a relevant rivalry in the colony, from beginning to end,
and it lay at the heart of the political-constitutional history of the
period. It was a contest between magistrates and non-magistrates, but
it was a contest over who was to administer law; the non-"magistrati-
call" rivals of the magistrates-the deputies-were no more "communal"
-internal, local, non-coercive, extralegal-than the magistrates.
As we have seen, woven into Konig's story of an increasingly legal-
istic society is the thesis of growing concern for personal liberty.
44. Pp. 29, 53, 81.
45. P. 31.
46. P. 36.
47. P. 26. Konig finds a general inclination to keep towns weak; in his discussion he
points out that for the colony-a corporation-to create other corporations, would have
been "flagrantly illegal." P. 22; see note 33 supra.
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While conceding that protection of personal liberty had been a recog-
nized goal from earliest days, being incorporated, for example, in the
Body of Liberties of 1641, Konig asserts that it was at first perceived
as protection against abuse of discretion by magistrates. Judicial safe-
guarding of individual liberties from encroachment by church and
town signaled that "magistracy was no longer an object of potential
distrust but had become a source of protection."4 Well, limits to
authority were indeed a concern from the first, but no less at last
than at first. Naturally concern about arbitrary government, thought
to be preventable by written laws, was voiced more while the drive
for written laws was on, and less when victory-and codification-had
been achieved. But the distrust of magistrates did not decrease, except
in the sense that they were believed shackled. Nor at any time was
distrust the main ingredient. Above all, magistrates were revered,
trusted, and looked to for protection.49 In my perception of the re-
ality of this period, there is no room for a communal ideal-beyond
mild preference-so constructed as not to include these officials and
the justice they administered.
B. The Ideal
Konig's view of the magistrate may strike sensitive chords in readers
who are historians either of the law or of Puritanism. The former
will ask, "What about the criminal law?", the latter, "What about
covenant theory?" These, superficially dissimilar, are in this context
essentially the same question; it is not accidental that the law of early
Massachusetts reached its point of greatest correspondence with Scrip-
ture in the definition and punishment of crime.5" We can hardly
speak of one without the other, or of either without the magistrates.
The question is whether we can speak of "paradigms" without either
criminal law or covenant theory or, therefore, the magistrate.
Every nation or people, the Puritans believed, existed by virtue
of a covenant with God, an agreement whereby they promised to
abide by His laws, and He in turn agreed to treat them well. To
help carry out their part of the bargain, people instituted gov-
ernments, and the business of government was to enforce God's
48. P. 104.
49. See p. 29 (Essex towns' pleas for resident magistrates). Even if the records were
not overflowing with evidence of this, one could point to the reelection, year after year,
of the same men to this most powerful office. See pp. 53-54 (Konig's treatment of this
continuity in office).
50. Especially capital crime. See G. HAslUNS, supra note 8, at 145-52.
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laws by punishing every detectable breach. Government in this
view had a sacred task and enjoyed divine sanction in carrying
it out.5 1
Man, depraved, could but be wicked, but
God recognized degrees of evil and rewarded men's minor vic-
tories over it by minor rewards. He brought prosperity and health
to nations which prevented or punished murder, adultery, theft,
and other open breaches of His commands.
52
And woe unto them who left sin unpunished.
Konig, of course, knows all this as well as anybody,53 and is aware
of the centrality of the criminal law, not merely in practice, where
indeed, more leniency is to be found than popular or primer history
would suggest,54 but ideologically. It may be that Konig would say,
even so, even in the criminal sphere, that communalism was the para-
digm. He might indeed go to the source just quoted for support:
"And punish they did, with the eager cooperation of the whole com-
munity, who knew that sin unpunished might expose them all to
the wrath of God." Parents, neighbors, congregations all joined in.
"With virtually the whole population for a police force Winthrop
found it no problem to punish sin." 55 I would say this captures per-
fectly the essence of the equal partnership-ideal and actual-of com-
munal and legal, but clearly an historian might, and Konig may,
think otherwise. 56 Or, he may be offering a highly sophisticated thesis
of ideological dissonance between civil and criminal spheres.5 7 Such
societal compartmentation is by no means impossible; it would be
interesting to see further work by Konig on this point.
A thesis might posit a communal ideal and at the same time allow
for recognition of the positive role of law. Blindness to the positive
potential of law, and specifically, law through litigation, is not a nec-
essary concomitant of a preference for the communal. Nor is there
any reason to conclude that it accompanied that preference in this
case. But Konig appears to have reached just that conclusion: "As
51. E. MORGAN, subra note 9, at 19.
52. Id. at 18-19.
53. P. 130.
54. G. HASKINS, subra note 8, at 151-53, 204-12.
55. E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 71.
56. It is unclear to me whether Konig believes that the early primacy of the com-
munal extends to criminal as well as civil law.
57. Statements emphasizing the colonists' early understanding of the need for law tend
to be made in the context of criminal law. See, e.g., pp. 3, 18. Konig does not directly
address this point.
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these realities came to be accepted, so too were the positive possibili-
ties of law admitted."' 51 But not, evidently, at first. The author is
impressed by the fact that the leaders of the Bay Colony were wont,
at first and only at first, to exhort their people not to sue their neigh-
bors.59 These exhortations do, certainly, evidence the founders' un-
derstanding that litigation can be destructive, but it is well to keep
in mind that they were issued in "the infancy of the plantation" when
none could know whether litigiousness would be carried to extremes
that would threaten survival of the enterprise. And of course, recog-
nition of the positive side of litigation can subsist happily with rec-
ognition of its destructive potential. In all, Konig, troubled by as-
sumptions that the courts were in later decades a desperate last resort,
seems to adopt the same assumptions for the first years of settlement,
with no greater justification.
Certain features of Konig's book complicate the life of the would-be
fair reviewer who rejects his communal ideal. For example, Konig
seems to feel less need than one might expect to prove that there was
a communal ideal. He appears, first, to believe that he is only follow-
ing tradition: "As is well known from many studies, this communal
ideal soon faded in the New World environment .... -"0 Konig's com-
munal ideal, as I see it, is not everybody's communal ideal; it would
be interesting, however, to see the argument as it might be made in
anticipation of, or in response to, challenge.0 1 Secondly, Konig may
have intended merely to emphasize that law was "paradigmatic" in
seventeenth-century Massachusetts. Then, since he does just that for
the later decades, it may be perverse, and even ungrateful, to attack
him for minimizing the role of law in the early years. An author may
find some irony in a reviewer's concentration of fire on that which is
intended to usher in the scholarly contribution.
Also, no book entirely escapes ambiguity; the reader is unlikely to
58. P. 191. But cf. pp. 8, 34. The book contains inconsistent statements on this, as on
the colonists' over-all attitude toward law. This review takes what appears to be the gen-
eral tenor of the book as the appropriate interpretation.
59. Pp. 188-89.
60. P. xiii (emphasis added).
61. He might, for example, have dealt directly with the issue of overall litigation rates.
See note 28 supra. A serious problem here is that in the earliest days of the colony,
complaints of every variety were brought originally to the courts (Assistants, General
Court) with colony-wide jurisdiction. With the years, legislation directed litigants to
lower courts, and penalties were imposed for bringing to a higher court cases within
the original jurisdiction of the lower court, usually the County Court. Thus without
studying all court records, quantification is problematic. Similar problems exist for cases
within the jurisdiction of the commissioners of small causes. See p. 86 (noting this prob-
lem in one context, but dismissing possibility that many cases went to commissioners for
small causes).
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feel entire certainty about the implications of Konig's communal
ideal for early colonial attitudes toward law.0 2 Consider, for example,
the state of not being "paradigmatic." If, to Konig, something may
be not-paradigmatic which merely comes in second in a photo-finish,
then there is little to choose between author and reviewer on the
position of law in Essex ideology.
Finally, there is the fact that community did indeed have a place
in the lives of the first generation of settlers that it was never again
to enjoy; something happened. Only in earliest days was the hand-
shake of a neighbor all that a man needed for security in matters of
real property.63 What is demonstrated, however, by the fact that when
the land-population ratio shifted, more was needed, and that it was
found in the coercive power of the courts? Not, it would seem, that
a communal ideal was defeated. But something.
III. Conclusion: Law, Society, and Legal History
Although Konig explores, with zest and in the greatest detail, the
parentage, patternings, and particulars of conflict, by and large his
interest in resolution-in litigation-stops at the courthouse door. This
is not, by the way, a criticism. If the origin of litigation were-as it is
not here-all that an historian had studied, done well-as it is here-
it would be enough. But this approach may impose certain limits on
the conclusions one can legitimately reach, particularly about the posi-
tive functions of litigation.
Konig refers to the "totality of norms" and the "rules" emerging
from lawsuits. 4 He tells us that an observer in a colonial courtroom
"learned what his society approved."0' 5 It might be protested that
without more information about the decisional process we can know
only that disputes were settled and those settlements abided by; that
is, that aggression was contained. There is something to this: the "to-
tality of norms" and "rules" emerging from lawsuits are of one variety
if decision is regularly on the law, and another if decision is usually
by general verdict. Further analysis would be interesting, but the
positive role of litigation, whatever its precise contours, is not really
open to doubt. It is the thesis of belated colonial awareness thereof
that is vulnerable.
62. See note 58 supra.
63. Pp. 46-47, 55-57. Similarly, the contribution of the community to the extirpation
of sin, see pp. 241-42 supra, decreased with time.
64. See pp. 69, 88.
65. Pp. 188-89.
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Konig, more interested in roles than rules, does inquire extensively
into the law in one area-real property. 6 The reader is thereby pre-
sented with a sample of legal response-substantive and procedural-
to societal demand, and incidentally, of the erudition and skill the
author can bring to the handling of technical legal material: trespass,
for example, is his servant. 67 Along with the considerable legal learn-
ing apparent throughout the book, however, there is a lack of sophis-
tication, not, finally, serious, but distracting. It surfaces on occasion
as error, but more commonly as something slightly awry, as in, for
example, the artless use of terms of legal art,68 or the failure to keep
sharp the distinction between accusation and guilt.69 In summary, it
may be said of Konig's handling of technical legal material that when
he is good, he is very, very good, and when he is bad he-unlike the
paradigm-only just misses the mark.
This recent addition to the distinguished Studies in Legal History
series is a kind of legal history we need more of. Its author, however,
may not be much impressed by the claims, such as they are, of "legal
history" to disciplinary status. Dividing the relevant scholarly world
into "legal scholars" and "scholars trained as historians," Konig ap-
pears rather to distance himself from the former. Praise for their
"fine studies" is balanced by the observation that such works are
written "from the perspective of their own discipline."70 This gener-
ally held view is problematic. The fact that many "legal scholars"
do not explore extensively the societal background and context of legal
conflict leads some to think that their works say nothing about "law
and society."7' The tendency is to put these books in their place: ex-
cellent reference books on rules, not roles. But even the narrowest
66. Pp. 35-63. In a methodological proposition which would find unreserved accep-
tance only in some circles, he tells us that legal changes "can best be approached, ana-
lyzed, and measured by examining the way in which social and economic development
and legal transformation were interrelated." P. 38. No attempt is made at a comprehensive
or sstematic review, even in one area, of law or legal change in seventeenth-century Essex.
This is not a necessary consequence of an interest in "law and society," but of an insti-
tutional bias. And, as always in an institutional study, the resulting treatment-random,
haphazard, depending on the fortuity of litigation-nicely echoes the origin and devel-
opment of the common law itself.
67. For example, Konig spots a previously unnoticed drawback to the use of trespass,
"the requirement of the plaintiff's actual possession of the land at some point in time,"
obviously a serious obstacle in a new land. P. 61; cf. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1008 (T. Cooley ed. 1899) (nineteenth-century cases using doctrine
of constructive possession for purposes of suit to deal with vacant land problem).
68. See note 39 supra.
69. Pp. 142-43, 154-55.
70. P. xi.
71. This belief reinforces the tendency to assume that books by "legal scholars" do
not explore societal context and background; some do not, some do.
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of these works may contribute substantially to one's understanding
of the role as well as the rule.
Scholars who devote prodigious amounts of time and energy to
the study of the history of law in a given society probably believe in
its overwhelming importance to that society; possibly, they turn to
their studies already convinced of it. Obviously it is not recommended
that one accept the a priori hypotheses of "legal scholars" on this
point; it is, however, to be hoped that all scholars will be receptive
to any proof which may be found in their completed works.
If one has, by training, the social historian's sensitivity to foci of
social control other than law, and/or the anthropologist's experience
with societies where, for a variety of reasons, the importance of "law"
does not go without saying, then that which "legal scholars" might
take for granted is naturally thought to require proof. Such healthy
skepticism is for the most part a boon: it keeps us all honest and pre-
vents the hardening of bias into dogma. But my belief that the works
of the "legal scholars" have established, incontrovertibly, that Mas a
chusetts was a legalisfic society from beginning to end, produces some
reflection on all this. Anybody may disagree with the assertion that
this is the message of the legal scholars, or with the message. The
question is whether legal historians like David Konig will altogether
miss such a message, if it is there, and accurate, because they think of
their colleagues in legal history as writing "from the perspective of
their own discipline."
One of the miracles of scholarship is the enormous benefit one can
gain from work with which one is in profound disagreement.72 Be-
yond the permissible differing of reasonable historians there lies, if
one is fortunate, respect and admiration for work with the mark of
excellence. That is my experience with this felicitously written, stimu-
lating, and informative book.
72. As one among many possible examples, Konig, whose account of the establishment
of a court system could hardly be less like mine, has provided a perspective on these
courts which casts a totally new light on certain fundamental issues in colonial legal
history. Similarly, although a world-view away from Konig's perception of colonial witch-
craft as an extralegal method of social control, I find his chapter on Salem witchcraft
marvelously illuminating.
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